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GREEN MEDICINE 247 21137p.pdf. 10. Gaul & Flaherty, supra note 6, at A15. The "gold standard" for safe distribution existed when manufacturers sold directly to the three largest distributors in the country, which in turn sold directly to drug dispensing entities, thereby involving no other wholesalers in distribution. Id.
11. Regarding the seizure of more than 70,000 doses of counterfeit Viagra, Aaron Graham, who had been an investigator for both the government and for the pharmaceutical industry, commented to Dateline, You might think medicines go straight from the factory to your pharmacy. But there's actually a complex network of wholesalers who buy and sell surplus medicines. All it takes is some phony paperwork and some realistic packaging to let fake medicine slip into the system, and be shipped to local pharmacies nationwide. And criminals know this. The drug distribution system in the United States is porous and vulnerable. Drugs are usually not sold directly from a manufacturer to a dispensing pharmacy.
Drugs weave their way through a complicated 10 distribution chain that includes large and small distributors, authorized and non-authorized distributors, and even criminal hands before reaching dispensing pharmacies which might, in turn, sell unused product back into the distribution chain.
11
This Article will consider the following: (1) How prescription drugs are distributed in the United States; (2) whether the law currently contains adequate safeguards to protect the integrity of the drug supply from counterfeiters; (3) how courts could hold manufacturers and authorized distributors vicariously liable for injuries caused by counterfeit drugs when such entities fail to take special precautions to avoid breaching a nondelegable duty of safe distribution; and (4) whether Congress should go beyond existing tort principles by imposing strict liability on manufacturers and distributors of pharmaceutical drugs when counterfeit drugs injure patients-much like the strict liability schemes for hazardous waste imposed by environmental laws such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the counterfeit drugs is both foreseeable and the social byproduct of otherwise 14 legitimate pharmaceutical manufacture and distribution.
II. HOW DRUGS ARE DISTRIBUTED IN THE UNITED STATES
Drugs in the United States generally do not travel straight from the line of production to the dispensing pharmacy. Rather, a serpentine maze provides a ripe environment for the infiltration of counterfeit, adulterated, and diverted drugs. 15 The distribution system is primarily tiered among manufacturers, the "Big 3" distributors/drug wholesalers, secondary wholesalers, and repackagers. 16 The FDA has identified three primary routes for drug sales in the United States, and each involves drugs passing through multiple hands, demonstrating the vulnerability of the distribution system to counterfeit, adulterated, and diverted products. 
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[T]hree models showing the movement of drugs through the U.S. drug distribution system. (The dotted lines indicate potential illegal sales.) In the simplest situation, the manufacturer sells directly to a retailer. However, in many instances, there can be one or more wholesalers, or even a repackager, who handles the drug before it reaches the retailer. It is in these intermediate steps, particularly when the wholesaler(s) and/or repackager(s) obtain products from sources other than the original manufacturer, that the greatest opportunities for compromising the security of the U.S. distribution system exist. and AmerisourceBergen, which collectively account for nearly 90% of the 20 primary wholesale market -sell drugs into a distribution web containing 21 large governmental agencies, secondary wholesalers, and criminal actors.
22
"Repackagers" of drugs further obscure the origin of a particular drug when they break wholesale drugs in bulk containers into smaller units for sale to pharmacies or, conversely, re-aggregate smaller units purchased as overstock 24. Even the New York State Attorney General has become concerned with the integrity and source of drugs that circulate in this web. His concern was triggered after a Long Island, New York, teenager and liver transplant recipient purchased from a local CVS adulterated medication that had traveled through a Miami strip club, a trailer, a laundry room, and then ten other facilities before reaching the shelves at CVS. EBAN, supra note 4, at 358 chart. Shortly after his mother injected him with the adulterated Epogen, Fagan convulsed at home and suffered radiating pain throughout his body. Id. at 122-24. He continued having these reactions after each injection until a staff person at CVS warned his mother that several vials of counterfeit Epogen bearing the same lot number as Fagan's drug had been found. Id.
25. The FDA stated that legitimate price differentials available because of temporary overstocks of drugs and quick turnaround for the temporary needs of pharmacies were among reasons to include multiple wholesaling entities in the distribution chain. FDA INTERIM REPORT 2003, supra note 7, § 2(A). The lobbyist organization for wholesale distributors, Healthcare Distribution Management Association, maintains that wholesale distributors play a critical role in making sure that patients do not suffer from shortfalls of medication, although they admit that wholesalers have no responsibility for ensuring that sufficient quantities of drugs are manufactured initially. Healthcare Distribution Management Association, Product Availability/Drug Shortage, http://www.healthcaredistribution.org/issues_in_dist/product.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2008 Although the government and wholesalers have maintained that legitimate reasons exist for so many entities to be involved in the distribution of drugs, 25 the primary factor fueling diversion that was identified in the legislative history of the Prescription Drug Marketing Act (PDMA) is the cycling of drugs from one entity to another before reaching dispensing pharmacies.
26
The high cost of drugs, "virtually anonymous distribution channels," and 27 high consumer demand compound the desire of counterfeiters to flood the marketplace with tainted drugs. The riches from such an illegal enterprise are great. One FDA official opined that "some of the experts are telling us it's 28 more lucrative to sell a counterfeit drug than it is [to sell] a narcotic such as heroin."
29
This complex maze of distribution allows tainted medicine to penetrate the legitimate marketplace at multiple points. In all-too-familiar patterns, criminals sell counterfeit, diverted, and adulterated drugs to small, unscrupulous wholesalers which, in turn, introduce the drugs into the distribution network. As the FDA itself has recognized, criminals can now 30. FDA INTERIM REPORT 2003, supra note 7, § 2(C). 31. In fact, Neil Spence, a high-level vice president of Cardinal Health, one of the three largest drug wholesalers in the United States, conspired with a drug counterfeiter and allowed thousands of doses of counterfeit plasma medicine into the back door of Cardinal Health, which were then distributed throughout the country. Indictment at 2-4, United States v. Carlow 33. EBAN, supra note 4, at 90. Manufacturers and large pharmacy retailers profit greatly from this web of a distribution system that "allows them to centralize their selling and purchasing and save billions in distribution costs." Id.
introduce counterfeit drugs at any point in the distribution process. A single 30 counterfeiter can contaminate a nation's drug supply at multiple levels of distribution. 31 Some may argue that the complicated system of distribution is "no one's fault." Nonetheless, manufacturers and major drug wholesalers are responsible for the establishment of the overly complex and unnecessarily obtuse web. The activities that occur in this web are not "beyond the control" of manufacturers. Very clearly, manufacturers have voluntarily 32 chosen not to engage in the business of distributing drugs to dispensing pharmacies. Further, they have chosen the group of distributors to which they sell. In addition, the three major wholesalers decide for themselves from 33 whom they buy and to whom they sell drugs. Until recently, the largest wholesalers maintained pharmaceutical arbitrage divisions that scavenged the marketplace, buying drugs from nearly all comers at the lowest expense 1988) . "The purpose of the legislation is to curb operation of the diversion market for prescription drugs that operates outside of normal channels of distribution and makes it difficult to protect American consumers from mislabeled, subpotent, adulterated, expired, or counterfeit pharmaceuticals." Id. at 2.
37. EBAN, supra note 4, at 107. 38. In its statutory findings, Congress stated that:
(1) American consumers cannot purchase prescription drugs with the certainty that the products are safe and effective.
(2) The integrity of the distribution system for prescription drugs is insufficient to prevent the introduction and eventual retail sale of substandard, ineffective, or even counterfeit drugs.
(3) The existence and operation of a wholesale submarket, commonly known as the "diversion market," prevents effective control over or even routine knowledge of the true sources of prescription drugs in a significant number of cases. Prescription Drug Marketing Act, § 2. 40. "The existence and operation of a wholesale submarket, commonly known as the 'diversion market,' prevents effective control over or even routine knowledge of the true sources of prescription drugs in a significant number of cases." Prescription Drug Marketing Act, § 2(3).
41. "The bulk resale of below wholesale priced prescription drugs by health care entities, for ultimate sale at retail, helps fuel the diversion market and is an unfair form of competition to wholesalers and retailers that must pay otherwise prevailing market prices." Id. § 2(7).
42. "The existing system of providing drug samples to physicians through manufacturer's representatives has been abused for decades and has resulted in the sale to consumers of misbranded, expired, and adulterated pharmaceuticals." Id. § 2(6).
43. Id. § 6(e)(1 52. On August 1, 1988 the FDA issued a guidance letter setting forth the agency's preliminary views regarding the industry's responsibilities under the PDMA. The letter stated that to be an "authorized distributor," the type of ongoing relationship that needed to exist was only a "continuing business relationship in which it is intended that the wholesale distributor engage in wholesale distribution of a manufacturer's prescription drug product or products." Letter from Daniel L. Michels & Thomas S. Bozzo, Directors, Food & Drug Administration Office of Compliance, to Regulated Industry and Other Interested Persons (Aug. 1, 1988), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdma/report2001/attachment-e.pdf. By stating that drug wholesalers only had to comply with existing recordkeeping practices of the industry, the FDA stayed the enforcement of a pedigree requirement, which wholesalers had never made an industry practice:
The new law's requirements for State licensing of wholesale drug distributors and the attendant requirements for minimum standards for recordkeeping, storage, and handling of prescription drugs pose potential economic implications for wholesale drug distributors. Although the statute itself does not specify these minimum standards, Congress clearly intended that these standards match currently recommended practices within the wholesale drug sector. The recommendation by the House of Representatives' Committee on Energy and Commerce for FDA to consider the Guidelines for the Inspection of Wholesales issued by the NABP provided explicit guidance on the specifications for these standards. FDA sought to conform the proposed minimum standards with the NABP guidelines and NWDA's-related proposed uniform standards by limiting modifications to conformance with current language and to clarifications required for consistency with existing drug regulations. Thus, the proposed minimum standards are intended to mirror recommended practices already existing among drug wholesalers.
The agency is not aware of the degree to which drug wholesalers comply with the various existing guidelines, but the agency believes that these represent the norm of current practices and procedures among drug wholesalers. prolonged ten-year rulemaking process and the following decade, the FDA 53. EBAN, supra note 4, at 386 n.165. The FDA finally promulgated a final rule regarding implementation of the pedigree in 1994, which required non-authorized distributors to include the name of each business who sold the drug starting with the manufacturer. 21 C.F.R. § 203.50 (2007) .
54. In its press release, the FDA stated that in an effort to protect the public from counterfeit drugs, "the FDA will fully implement regulations related to the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, which requires drug distributors to provide documentation of the chain of custody of drug products-the so-called 'pedigree'-throughout the distribution system." Press Release, U.S. 56. The FDA claimed it had not received many complaints from small wholesalers about the impact of requiring pedigrees and finally recognized it could no longer justify delaying the requirement. FDA News, supra note 54.
57 Sadly, a fully implemented federal pedigree requirement is still not a reality. In RxUSA Wholesale, Inc. v. Department of HHS, secondary wholesalers, which would not qualify as "authorized distributors" under the PDMA, alleged that implementation of the pedigree requirement by FDA regulations at section 203.50, the PDMA, or the two in conjunction, was an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The wholesalers argued that the pedigree 57 regulation constituted disparate treatment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause in as much as it arbitrarily and capriciously required non-authorized distributors to trace products back to the manufacturer while exempting authorized distributors, thus preventing non-authorized distributors from conducting business.
In addition, the wholesalers argued that FDA Identifying statement for sales by unauthorized distributors. Before the completion of any wholesale distribution by a wholesale distributor of a prescription drug for which the seller is not an authorized distributor of record to another wholesale distributor or retail pharmacy, the seller shall provide to the purchaser a statement identifying each prior sale, purchase or trade of such drug. The regulation goes on to specify what information shall be contained in that identifying statement. See id.
the PDMA, which requires that wholesale customers be informed of "all prior sales of the product." 60 On November 30, 2006, seven days before the long-anticipated effective date of a federal pedigree requirement, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a preliminary injunction staying the implementation of the federal pedigree requirement. The court disregarded 61 the government's anemic laches claim (that it would suffer prejudice if the court delayed the implementation of the pedigree rule) given that the FDA itself had delayed the rule's implementation for so long. Regrettably, no 62 other federal legislation currently requires pedigrees in the distribution chain. The need for a fully implemented PDMA is apparent. 63 64
If federal pedigrees become mandatory, the definition of what qualifies as an exempt "authorized distributor" under the PDMA is nevertheless too broad to provide real protection to consumers. Under the PDMA, an "authorized distributor" is exempt from having to produce any pedigree when transacting pharmaceuticals. In 1999, the FDA promulgated its final rule 65 and deemed that, without receiving any further governmental scrutiny, an "authorized distributor" is anyone with an "ongoing relationship" with a 2007] GREEN MEDICINE 257 66. The regulations define an "authorized distributor" as a "distributor with whom a manufacturer has established an ongoing relationship to distribute such manufacturer's products." Id. § 203.3(b). An "ongoing relationship" is further defined in § 203.1(u) as the following:
Ongoing relationship means an association that exists when a manufacturer and a distributor enter into a written agreement under which the distributor is authorized to distribute the manufacturer's products or a period of time or for a number of shipments. If the distributor is not authorized to distribute a manufacturer's entire product line, the agreement must identify the specific drug products that the distributor is authorized to distribute. 67. In responding to the question, "What information should be in the written agreement between a manufacturer and an ADR?," the FDA merely reiterated the definition of "ongoing relationship" contained 68. In a press release posted on its website on June 9, 2006, following the FDA lifting the stay on the federal pedigree requirement, the HDMA suggested changing the definition of "authorized distributor" and "distributor" in general to the following: "Authorized Distributor of Record" means a drug distributor with whom a manufacturer has established an ongoing relationship to distribute the manufacturer's product. An ongoing relationship is deemed to exist when a drug distributor, including any affiliated group, as defined in Section 1504 of the Internal Revenue Code, of which the distributor is a member: a) Is listed on the manufacturer's list and the list is updated monthly, or b) Has a written agreement currently in effect with the manufacturer, or c) Has a verifiable account with the manufacturer and minimal transaction or volume requirement thresholds as follows: 5,000 sales units per company within twelve (12) months or twelve (12) purchases (invoices) from the manufacturer within twelve (12) months. "Distribution or wholesale distribution" means the distribution of prescription drugs to persons other than a consumer or patient, but does not include: a) Intracompany sales; b) The purchase or other acquisition by a hospital or other health care entity that is a member of a group purchasing organization of a drug for its own use from the group purchasing organization or from other hospitals or health care entities that are members of such organizations; c) The sale, purchase, or trade of a drug or an offer to sell, purchase, or trade a drug by a charitable organization to a nonprofit affiliate of the organization to the extent otherwise permitted by law; d) The sale, purchase, or trade of a drug or an offer to sell, purchase, or trade a drug among manufacturer. Thus, no governmental entity exercises oversight in certifying 66 which entities are "safe enough" to be trusted without a traceable history of distribution. Even when the FDA issued guidance documents for the drug industry regarding compliance with the PDMA in 2006, the nonbinding recommendations provided no additional procedures to clearly identify an authorized distributor of record. Ironically, even the Healthcare Distribution 67 Management Association (HDMA)-the lobbyist organization for wholesale distributors-noted that the definition of an authorized distributor under the PDMA should be enhanced to make any current pedigree requirements meaningful. hospitals or other health care entities that are under common control; e) The sale, purchase, or trade of a drug or an offer to sell, purchase, or trade a drug for emergency medical reasons; f) The sale, purchase, or trade of a drug, an offer to sell, purchase, or trade a drug, or the dispensing of a drug under a prescription executed in accordance with section __ of this chapter; g) The distribution of drug samples by manufacturers' and authorized distributors' representatives; h) The sale, purchase, or trade of blood or blood components intended for transfusion; i) Drug returns, when conducted by a hospital, health care entity, or charitable institution in accordance with section ______ of this chapter or the Boards'/Departments' regulations; or j) The sale of minimal quantities of drugs by retail pharmacies to licensed practitioners for office use. "Distributor or wholesale distributor" means any person engaged in the distribution of prescription drugs, including, but not limited to, manufacturers; repackers; own-label distributors; private-label distributors; jobbers; brokers; warehouses, including manufacturers' and distributors' warehouses, chain drug warehouses, and drug warehouses; and retail pharmacies that conduct drug distributions as defined in this section. Healthcare Dist. Mgmt. Assoc., Recommendations for Enhancing the Domestic Prescription Drug Supply A16. An owner of a wholesaler must submit his own fingerprints, employ an authorized representative with 6,000 hours of experience, and provide a complete list of employees/agents. Id. Only if a corporation is publicly traded is the owner exempt from the fingerprinting and employee list requirements. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 639.593(7) (2007) . Although the regulation shoved many wholesalers out of state, Nevada by itself cannot clean up the nation's distribution problems. Wholesalers merely moved across state lines and continued to distribute bad medicine into the porous national drug supply. Gaul & Flaherty, supra note 6. However, Nevada did enact a stringent pedigree requirement, requiring wholesalers to pass pedigrees when the wholesaler is either (1) not an authorized distributor of a medicine or (2) when a wholesaler bought a drug from a source other than the manufacturer. See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 639.603(1) (2007) .
71. California has repeatedly delayed implanting a comprehensive state pedigree law, having just this year pushed the state law's implementation date back to January 1, 2011. Press Release, California Bd. 
B. State Law Attempts to Source the Drug Distribution Chain
Faced with a federal pedigree requirement effectively stuck in purgatory, some states did undertake the burden of attempting to craft meaningful protection for consumers against counterfeit, adulterated, and fake medicines. 73. The Grand Jury noted that tainted drugs move easily through the national drug distribution chain because of the failure of state and federal agencies to enforce the law and because of the "complicity of the wholesalers who turn a blind eye to the corrupt practices of other wholesalers that supply them with some of their pharmaceuticals." SUPREME COURT OF Legislative findings and intent.-Based on the report of the Seventeenth Statewide Grand Jury in its First Interim Report the Legislature finds that prescription drugs brought into the state by wholesalers are being relabeled and falsely represented as being of a higher dosage by other wholesalers in order to charge higher prices for those drugs and that counterfeit substances labeled as genuine pharmaceuticals are being distributed, thereby causing an extreme danger that persons eventually receiving the drugs by prescription are receiving ineffective drugs in nontherapeutic doses, or even receiving dangerous or unwholesome substances, with the result that the health and well-being of the public is at risk. The Statewide Grand Jury also found that the lack of an effective pedigree paper requirement has resulted in the inability of prescription drug users to have confidence in the purity and efficacy of the drugs they use. 80. Before recent amendments, the Florida Department of Health had the power to require wholesalers to provide complete pedigrees, including all prior sales and unique identifying lot numbers, of drugs on a "specified list." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0121(6)(e) (West 2005) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 499.0121(6)(d) (West 2007)). The department could place a drug "on the list of specified drugs if the department [had] seized or issued a stop sale notice on the . . . drug because of adulteration, counterfeiting or diversion of the prescription drug from" legal distributions channels, or if the FDA or another government regulator "responsible for the sale or distribution of prescription drugs in another state has notified the department" of such contamination of a drug in the legitimate marketplace, so long as the prescription drug satisfied one of the following criteria:
(I) The prescription drug is included among the top 150 prescription drugs for which the state has incurred the highest amount of Medicaid claims in the most recently ended state fiscal year; , a document in a form approved by the Department of Health and containing information that records each distribution of any given legend drug, from sale by a pharmaceutical manufacturer, through acquisition and sale by any wholesaler or repackager, until final sale to a pharmacy or other person administering or dispensing the drug. The information required to be included on a legend drug's pedigree paper must at least detail the amount of the legend drug, its dosage form and strength, its lot numbers, the name and address of each owner of the legend drug and his or her signature, its shipping information, including the name and address of each person certifying delivery or receipt of the legend drug, and a certification that the recipient has authenticated the pedigree papers. It must also include the name, address, telephone number and, if available, e-mail contact information of each wholesaler involved in the chain of the legend drug's custody. The department shall adopt rules and a form relating to the requirements of this paragraph no later than 90 days after the effective date of this act. 87. The alternate definition of "pedigree" reads: A statement, under oath, in written or electronic form, confirming that a wholesale distributor purchases and receives the specific unit of the prescription drug directly from the manufacturer of the prescription drug and distributes the prescription drug directly, or through an intracompany transfer, to a chain pharmacy warehouse or a person authorized by law to purchase prescription drugs for the purpose of administering or dispensing the drug, as defined in § 465.003. For purposes of this paragraph, the term "chain pharmacy warehouse" means a wholesale distributor permitted pursuant to § 499.01 that maintains a physical location for prescription drugs that functions solely as a central warehouse to perform intracompany transfers of such drugs to a member of its affiliated group as described in § 499.0121(6)(h)1.
1. The information required to be included pursuant to this subparagraph must include: a. The following statement: "This wholesale distributor purchased the specific unit of the prescription drug directly from the manufacturer." b. The manufacturer's national drug code identifier and the name and address of the wholesaler and the purchaser of the prescription drug. c. The name of the prescription drug as it appears on the label. d. The quantity, dosage form, and strength of the prescription drug. 2. The wholesale distributor must also maintain and make available to the department, upon request, the point of origin of the prescription drugs, including intracompany transfers; the date of the shipment from the manufacturer to the wholesale distributor; the lot numbers of such drugs; and the invoice numbers from the manufacturer. "pedigree" as merely a document which states the name and strength of a drug accompanied by a promise by the manufacturer that "this wholesale distributor purchased the specific unit of the prescription drug directly from the manufacturer." This change eliminates the ability of law enforcement 87 officers, customers, and agencies to find the source of counterfeit drugs using the unique lot number from the pedigree paper. The promise of a lesser financial burden to particularly needy cancer patients means little if the prescription drugs provided to them could put their lives in jeopardy. While the cancer drug donation program is a viable concept that could ease some financial worries for some cancer patients, the greater concern to our organization is overall patient safety. In other words, Governor, we feel that it is more important to save lives than to save money.
It truly disappoints us to be in a position to recommend that you veto a bill that includes a positive new tool in the fight against cancer, but we feel the greater good would be served by staying the course with the drug pedigree process in current statute. One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965) .
103. "Work is inherently dangerous when it creates a peculiar risk of harm to others unless special precautions are taken." Pusey v. Bator, 762 N.E.2d 968, 973 (Ohio 2002) (holding that hiring armed guards to protect property was inherently dangerous activity as the employer could foresee that an armed confrontation might be required to do the job). Some courts have blurred the distinction between work of a peculiar risk and inherently dangerous work when discussing the finding of a nondelegable duty. See, e.g., Privette v. Super. Ct., 854 P.2d 721, 723 (Cal. 1993) ("Under the peculiar risk doctrine, a person who hires an independent contractor to perform work that is inherently dangerous can be held liable for tort damages when the contractor's negligent performance of the work causes injuries to others.").
104. See Wilson, 757 F.2d at 1303 (reasoning that cases should be read to suggest that two distinct types of independent contractor activity can bring an employer within the nondelegable duty exception to vicarious liability).
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 cmt. b (1965). The comment reads: It is not, however, necessary to the employer's liability that the work be of a kind which cannot be done without a risk of harm to others, or that it be of a kind which involves a high degree of risk of such harm, or that the risk be one of very serious harm, such as death or serious bodily injury. It is not necessary that the work call for any special skill or care in doing it. It is sufficient that work of any kind involves a risk, recognizable in advance, of physical harm to others which is inherent in the work itself.
Id.
106 of harm to the public against which the public has little ability to protect itself because of the specialized knowledge involved in an industry, that activity should not need to be "inherently dangerous" to trigger a nondelegable duty. A business enterprise is inherently dangerous if danger exists in doing the activity, regardless of the method used or how skillful the independent contractor may be at the given activity.
Conversely 125. Although I do sit on the Advisory Board for Secure Symbology, this article does not advocate that any one of the listed options for improving the security of the drug supply should be mandatory or preferred by the courts, the FDA, or Congress. Companies should exercise their autonomy and select the safety procedure that meets their own corporate needs so long as it adequately safeguards patients' health.
126. This would stand in contrast to the current requirements which, if enforced, would still exempt manufacturers and all authorized distributors from a pedigree requirement. See 21 C.F.R. § 203.50 (2007) .
127. Secure Symbology provides unique, multi-dimensional bar codes that help track a drug to the point of sale for use on individual units of drugs, cases of drugs, pallets of drugs, and larger containers of drugs. Describing one of its products, the ESC System, the company states that:
Secure Symbology Inc.'s ESC System provides "track and trace" reliability from production to pharmacist, assuring consumer protection, while meeting the stringent compliance requirements of federal and state regulatory agencies. It accomplishes this by using globally accepted machine-readable bar code symbologies, and/or the emerging RFID technology, within the context of SSI's patented and novel utilization of construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of databases. Secure Symbology, Secure Health, http://securesymbology.com/health.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
128. Inksure Technologies stated that it offers a covert, encoded, machine-readable unique ink that a companion scanner detects during inventory control. Inksure Technologies, Inksure's Security Approach for Our Customers, http://www.inksure.com/default.asp?psys=solutions (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
129. RFID is defined as the following:
[A] generic term for technologies that use radio waves to automatically identify people or objects. There are several methods of identification, but the most common is to store a serial number that identifies a person or object, and perhaps other information, on a microchip that is attached to an antenna (the chip and the antenna together are called an RFID transponder or Undoubtedly, given their substantial financial resources, manufacturers and large distributors have the best knowledge of the dangers of drug distribution. They are also in the best position to identify the precautions that are necessary to safely perform the job. This "top-down" approach to vicarious liability 124 therefore ensures that those manufacturers and authorized distributors that unscrupulously barter for the lowest-cost drugs without taking precautions to ensure drug integrity and safety do not escape liability.
To protect themselves against vicarious liability and to satisfy their nondelegable duty of care, manufacturers and distributors would only need to take those special safety precautions that are readily available to them. 130. Applied DNA Sciences offers markers for implementation that uniquely identify a real product from a counterfeit. Describing its patented SigNature markers, the company stated:
[W]e use DNA segments from one or more botanical sources, rearrange them into unique encrypted sequences, and then implement one or more layers of anti-counterfeit techniques.
Because the portion of DNA in a SigNature DNA Marker used to identify the marker is so minute, it cannot be detected unless it is replicated billions of times over, or amplified. This amplification can only be achieved by applying matching strands of DNA, or a primer, and PCR techniques to the SigNature DNA Marker. The sequence of the relevant DNA in a SigNature DNA Marker must be known in order to manufacture the primer for that DNA. Applied DNA Sciences, The SigNature Program, http://www.adnas.com/signature (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
131. Electronic pedigrees can be produced once a manufacturer or distributor employs a tracker, such as a bar code or RFID, a data management base, and a communications mechanism to relay information to partners. See VeriSign, Supply Chain Information Center, http://www.verisign.com/global-consulting/ supply-chain-services/supply-chain-information/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2007) . VeriSign markets an Electronic Pedigree Service that it states can manage these three components efficiently. Id. SupplyScape sells a computer software application, Supplyscape E-pedigree, which works in conjunction with other technology to produce pedigree papers electronically, cutting down the cost and amount of human hours necessary to provide source documentation for drugs. SupplyScape, Product Security e-Pedgree Overview, http://www.supplyscape.com/products/security/pedigree/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2008 139. The RCRA allows private citizens to bring suit against a past or present generator, operator, or owner who has contributed or is contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. Id.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B). The EPA Administrator can bring similar suits under the RCRA when health is endangered. Id. § 6973(a). CERCLA also focuses on the threat to public health as the trigger for action, including when the President may abate activity which poses such a threat:
[W]hen the President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may require the Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2000).
compromised by health conditions and so manifestly vulnerable. The dangers posed by counterfeit drugs range from death by poisoning, at the worst, to the ingestion of non-active ingredients by sick consumers, which itself can lead to a patient's decline, eventual illness, and even death. Additionally, the interrelationship of manufacturers-which as patent holders stand in a unique position as sole suppliers of a medicine or a group of medicines-and the distributors-which serve them further-illustrates the need for a special liability standard.
V. "GOING GREEN": WHY CODIFYING A STRICT LIABILITY STANDARD FOR THE INCIDENCE OF COUNTERFEIT DRUGS MAKES SENSE
Beyond the vicarious liability option outlined above, another approach to secure the drug supply chain would be for Congress to enact legislation imposing strict liability on manufacturers and distributors for injuries caused by counterfeit drugs. Environmental laws already impose strict liability for injuries caused by the distribution of hazardous chemical byproducts of legitimate industry. These laws, driven by a concern for the public health, 138 provide both an analogy and a blueprint for Congress to create a strict liability scheme for injuries caused by the distribution of counterfeit drugs which-like hazardous waste-are harmful chemicals representing the byproduct of a legitimate industry. 151. In United States v. Price, the court noted:
[T]he strict liability standard fits most closely with the legislative aims of CERCLA which include goals such as cost-spreading and assurance that responsible parties bear their cost of the clean up. The fulfillment of these Congressional goals is more likely to be effectuated if the defendants who allegedly contributed to the environmental mess are now held to a very stringent standard of liability. Though strict liability may impose harsh results on certain defendants, it is the most equitable solution in view of the alternative-forcing those who bear no responsibility for causing the damage, the taxpayers, to shoulder the full cost of the clean up. 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 (D.C.N.J. 1983) (citations omitted). With Senator Randolph concurring, Senator Cannon discussed why section 107(e)(1) was enacted, stating:
It is my understanding that this section is designed to eliminate situations where the owner or operator of a facility uses its economic power to force the transfer of its liability to other persons, as a cost of doing business, thus escaping its liability under the act all together.
CERCLA is "backwards looking," as the provisions are not regulatory in nature and instead focus on creating broad civil liability for the cleanup of leaking sites of waste treatment, transport, storage, and disposal. CERCLA 147 provides that the federal government, states, or private citizens may bring actions to recover costs incurred in responding to the release of hazardous substances. CERCLA joins the RCRA in imposing liability without regard 148 to a liable party's fault or state of mind. Responsible parties may be jointly 149 and severally liable, although liability may also be apportioned among defendants in appropriate cases.
The intent of including a strict liability 150 standard in CERCLA and not allowing parties to contract out of that liability was to ensure that economic power did not enable manufacturers to shift liability for harm to those transporting, distributing, or treating the hazardous material.
151
Utilizing the same public-health rationale that motivated the imposition of strict liability in both the RCRA and CERCLA, Congress could impose a strict liability scheme for manufacturers and distributors when counterfeit drugs pass through the legitimate distribution system and injure patients. The similarities between the two situations are manifold. The hazardous waste contemplated by the environmental statutes and fake medicine are both chemical compounds. Manufacturers of pharmaceutical drugs are similar to the generators of industrial waste which, when making their legitimate and valuable products, produce hazardous chemical byproducts. In the context of generators, the chemical product is the hazardous waste itself. In the pharmaceutical context, the high drug prices set by manufacturers entice profit-seeking criminals to pollute the drug stream, creating the social byproduct of counterfeit drugs. Just as Congress did not allow generators of hazardous waste to use their economic might to contract out of liability for hazards later caused by the disposal of that waste, so too should Congress hold manufacturers responsible for injuries caused by counterfeit drugs rather than allowing them to escape liability through the hiring of distributors.
Drug distributors should also be held jointly and severally liable for injuries caused by counterfeit drugs since those distributors are similar to the "transporters" of hazardous waste covered by the environmental statutes. 152 Drug distributors can choose to buy medicine solely from manufacturers and thereby avoid sources which open doors for criminals to penetrate the drug supply. Instead, distributors try to increase their profits by engaging in pharmaceutical arbitrage, in some cases buying medicines at costs even lower than those offered by the manufacturers of those drugs. Like transporters
